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Abstract
This paper establishes a link between labor market frictions and financial market frictions.
We present empirical evidence about the relation between search and financial frictions. Then,
we build a stylized DSGE model that features this channel. Simulation excercises show that the
model with this channel generates a strong internal propagation mechanism, replicates stylized
labor market effects of the Great Recession, and, most importantly, creates a jobless recovery.
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The recent financial and economic crisis - known as the Great Recession - has shown that distur-
bances generated in financial markets can create large adverse spill-over effects towards the real
economy: A turmoil in the financial and banking system generated a decrease in real and financial
wealth which resulted in a drop in aggregate demand and economic activity. One particularly
important feature of this recession is the persistently high unemployment rate. Figure 1 plots
the evolution of GDP and unemployment during the Great Recession.1 We observe that the un-
employment rate is still above its pre-crisis level, while output has already exceeded its pre-crisis
level. This finding lead many observes to believe in a jobless recovery. Along this line, Calvo et
al. (2012) show that financial crises have been associated with jobless recoveries.2 They show that
financial crises are particularly bad for the labor market as they amplify the usual adverse effects
of recessions. Due to the different nature of financial crises it might be expected that they have
larger effect on the real economy. However, it is less obvious that they have larger effects on the
labor market. Calvo et al. (2012) develop a stylized model with binding collateral constraints
and the assumption that labor costs are harder to collateralize than physical capital. Therefore,
capital-intensive projects benefit and the recovery becomes "jobless".
Historically, jobless recoveries are a European phenomenon. Blanchard and Summers (1986)
argue that high and persistent unemployment rates in Europe are the results of hysteresis due to
labor market rigidities.3 From the 1990’s jobless recoveries can also be found in the United States.
Obviously, the rigid labor market hypothesis fails to explains this observation. In contrast, the
flexible labor market was blamed to cause jobless recoveries due to structural change, uncertainty,
and increasing health costs (see Bernanke (2003) and Groshen and Potter (2003)).
In this paper we establish a link between labor market (search and matching) frictions and
financial market frictions. The paper has two goals, (i) empirically establish a link between the
two type of frictions and (ii) to present a model with this link in order to discuss the qualitative
effects. To be precise, the paper has two contributions and proceeds in two steps: first, we present
empirical evidence about the relation between search and financial frictions. Second, we build a
stylized DSGE model that features this channel. It should be stressed that the story in this paper
is not a propagation story in the sense that combining search and financial frictions will amplify the
effect of shocks.4 On the contrary, we establish a direct link between the two frictions, a novelty in
the literature.
Several results stand out. The first contribution is empirical. We start by constructing the
time series for match efficiency and financial frictions. Then, we regress match efficiency on several
1A similar pattern is also found for the Euro Area.
2Other papers dealing with the effects of financial crises on unemployment include Reinhart and Reinhart (2010),
Bernal-Verdugo et al. (2012), and Chodorow-Reich (2013).
3That is to say that the long-run unemployment rate depends on the entire time series of unemployment. For
example, due to unions.
4For example, Chugh (2009), Petrosky-Nadeau (2014), and Caggese and Perez (2015) study this and related
questions.
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Figure 1: We plot the time series for GDP (left axis) and the unemployment rate (right axis) from
2007Q4 (= 100) until 2015Q2.
explanatory variables including financial frictions. We find that financial frictions are significant
as well as several labor market variables. Further, using a rolling window approach, we document
time variability in the link between search and financial frictions. While the relation is fairly stable
prior to the crisis, during the Great Recession we observe a larger and varying relation between
the two frictions. While prior to the crisis we observe a positive relation, in the crisis we observe
a negative relation for an extended period of time. A positive relation implies that more frictions
in the financial market increase the efficiency of the labor market. Therefore, a negative relation
is the worst-case scenario as both frictions increase. As it turns out, this new channel helps to
understand jobless recoveries: the negative relation between the two frictions roughly occurs at the
same time GDP goes back to pre-crisis levels. Then, we estimate a VECM model, show that a
shock to financial frictions increases match efficiency, and discuss major driving forces in a variance
decomposition analysis.
The second contribution is theoretical. We build a DSGE model with search and matching
frictions and financial frictions that includes our new channel and compare it to a standard model
with this channel. We simulate the model and show that the model with a strong, negative relation
between the two frictions generates a jobless recovery and creates a strong internal propagation
mechanism. Further, the simulated model dynamics are in line with the stylized empirical facts
of the Great Recession. The model generates a simultaneous increase in financial frictions and a




In this section I will discuss how to obtain a time series for match efficiency. For this purpose, I
use the search and matching theory developed by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).5 Trade in the
labor market is uncoordinated, costly, and time-consuming. Search takes place on a discrete and
closed market. Workers can be either employed or unemployed, such that there is no out of labor
force option.
If the job is filled, it is subject to the probability of being destroyed ρt. In addition, firms create
jobs at the rate M(Ut, Vt) at the non-state-contingent cost of c > 0 units of output per vacancy,
where M is the homogeneous-of-degree-one-matching-function,





where mt > 0 gives the match efficiency and 1 > µ > 0 is the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to unemployment.6 Unemployment is given by Ut and Vt is the vacancy rate.
Further, it can be shown that new matches are equal to
M (Ut, Vt) = (1− Ut)ρt. (2)




















Having discussed the measure of labor market frictions, this section discusses a measure of financial
frictions following the paper by Hall (2013). In this paper financial frictions, FFt, are measured













Extra units of output
− (1 +Rt)  
Safe rate
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5See Barlevy (2011) and Veracierto (2011) for a similar approach.
6Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) find that the Cobb-Douglas function with constant returns to scale is the most
appropriate specification.
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and gives the shadow price of physical capital. Here, κ > 0 measures capital adjustment costs.
Output is denoted by Yt and the capital stock is Kt, depreciated at the constant rate δ > 0.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, α gives the elasticity of the production function
with respect to capital. The safe rate is driven by the real return on capital, rt.
From this definition for the spread, (5), it should be clear that the tax wedge, the risk premium,
and various spreads from different financial frictions (e.g. agency frictions within producing firms,
financial intermediaries, and frictions between financial institutions and investors) are included.
This measure of financial frictions is superior to measures that rely on spreads between corporate
bonds and U.S. treasury bonds, as they are able to explain the prolonged slump after the financial
crisis as shown by Hall (2013).
2.3 Data Set
For our empirical analysis we need to obtain time series for match efficiency (4) and financial
frictions (5). Therefore, we need several other time series. We use data for the United States
starting in 2001:M2 and ending in 2014:M3 (158 observations) being on a monthly frequency.
For the match efficiency we need the unemployment rate taken from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS, for short): LNS14000000, measured in percent for all workers 16 years and over,
seasonally adjusted. Second, we use the time series for total separations (as a rate) from the JOLTS
database at the BLS: JTS00000000TSR, for total nonfarm separations. Finally, we use the time
series for total nonfarm job openings for vacancies (JTS00000000JOR).
For the time series for financial frictions we use the following data. The LIBOR rate (USD12MD156N)
from the St. Louis database FRED and the real gross domestic product (GPDMC1) for output.
The capital stock series is taken from the Penn World Table 8.0 (RKNANPUSA666NRUG) at
constant national prices. If time series are not available at a monthly frequency they are converted
into monthly frequency using the quadratic-match average.
2.4 A Preliminary Look at the Data
Figure 2 plots the time series for the match efficiency and the financial friction. Doing so requires
to calibrate some structural parameters. We assume µ = 0.18. The capital share in the production
function is set to 40 percent, α = 0.4. The capital depreciation rate is set to an annual value of
10 percent, δ = 0.025. The capital adjustment costs are taken from the estimations by Smets and
Wouters (2007) and is set to a value of κ = 6.
We find an almost perfect comovement between financial and labor market frictions until 2009.
An upswing starting at the first recession in our sample (2001) lead to a quite persistent increase
in financial frictions but increased efficiency in the labor market. A downturn can be observed
starting around 2004 when the labor market became less efficient but the financial market becomes
less frictional. The minimum in financial frictions, over our sample period, is obtained during
2006/2007, which is roughly the time the housing bubble in the United States peaked and bursted.
From this low financial frictions increased, except for a short but large drop in 2008, until the
5







































Figure 2: Time Series for the match efficiency (left scale, black solid line) and financial frictions
(right scale, red dashed line).
end of our sample. For the labor market, we also observe an increase in match efficiency until
2009, when a sharp negative trend starts that continues until, approx., 2012. For the rest of our
sample match efficiency stays roughly constant. What we can infer from the graphical inspection
is that prior to the financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession, high inefficiency in the
financial market went hand-in-hand with a high efficiency in the labor market. This holds for the
recession in 2001 but does not hold for the Great Recession. It appears that there is something
structurally different between the two recessions, although both - for different reasons - started in
the financial (i.e. stock) market. This pattern is also visible using a scatter plot of the two time
series (Figure 3). It appears that there is a significant positive relation between financial and labor
market frictions. This holds roughly until financial frictions are larger than 0.11. Then, we observe
a clear and even stronger negative relationship between the two variables. Again, this is driven by
the Great Recession as we have seen values of 0.11 for financial frictions associated with a high
match efficiency. Everything above seems to generate a different behavior between the two markets.
The observed pattern might offers some insights into the slow recovery of the U.S. economy.
First, higher financial frictions interfere with a proper functioning of the financial markets and,
since investment should be inversely related to this friction, this will - ceteris paribus - lead to a
lower level of output. Second, a persistently lower match efficiency leads to less jobs created and the
value of the out-of-labor force option increases; two phenomenons that we observed in the United
States: a strong and fairly persistent increase in the unemployment rate and a drop in the labor
market participation rate.
6





















Figure 3: Scatter plot of financial frictions vs. match efficiency.
3 Estimation
3.1 OLS
Having discussed the time series for match efficiency and financial frictions (spread), we are inter-
ested in establishing a link between the two frictions. For this purpose, we start by estimating a
single-equation model using OLS. Table 1 presents the estimated coefficients with standard errors
and significance levels. Given the size of our data set we estimate the model with two lags and
a constant.7 Most importantly, the one-period lag of financial frictions (spread) is significant and
has the largest coefficient across all variables. Further, our results show that there is a significant
contemporaneous and two-month lag for vacancies, separations, and unemployment. While the
contemporaneous effect is negative, the lag has a positive effect for unemployment and vacancies.
Rather surprisingly, the participation rate and GDP have no significant effect. It should be stressed
that higher lags of the participation rate and GDP are significant.
3.2 Rolling Windows
In the previous section we have shown that there is a significant effect from financial frictions
towards match efficiency. In the following, we want to show that this relation is subject to time-
instability. We use a rolling window OLS regression with a twelve month window size.8
7The estimation with four lags also shows a significant effect of financial frictions on match efficiency. The results
are available upon request.
8Robustness checks with a six month and an 18 months window supporting our findings are shown in the appendix.
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Table 1: OLS estimation results. Significance levels: 1%: ∗∗∗, 5%: ∗∗, 10%: ∗. R2adj = 0.97.







































Figure 4 shows the estimated coefficient (in blue) for financial frictions with the 90 percent con-
fidence bands plotted in red. Given that in a rolling windows regression we have less observations,
we choose to estimate a parsimonious model. We regress the match efficiency on a constant, lagged
match efficiency, financial frictions, and GDP. Therefore, we need to be careful in our assessment
of the significance of the estimated parameters. Overall, given that the estimated value of the link
between financial frictions and match efficiency is around -0.8 the low number of observations leads
to fairly large confidence bands.
Nevertheless, at the beginning of our sample, we find a negative relation between search and
financial frictions. One should remind that a negative relation is the worst-case as an increase
in financial frictions lowers match efficiency, i.e. increases labor market frictions. This negative
relation occurs during the recession of the early 2000’s. The unemployment rate started to increase
from the beginning of 2001 and peaked in the second quarter of 2002. The negative relation
between the two frictions could explain this first jobless recovery in our sample. As financial frictions
increased over this period (cf. figure 2), the negative relation implies a drop in match efficiency. As
a consequence the labor market is less efficient and it takes, ceteris paribus, a longer period of time
to reduce unemployment. After this recession we observe a significant positive relation between the
two frictions with small standard errors in 2003 and from 2009 to 2010.
This holds until the emergence of the Great Recession. From the second half of 2011 to the
second half of 2013, we find a strong negative relation with values of around -50. This is the time
period during which the unemployment rate should have decreased faster as GDP returned to pre-
crisis levels. The negative spill-over implies a less efficient labor market that clearly interfered with
a faster reduction of unemployment. From the second half of 2013 towards the end of our sample,
8








Figure 4: Rolling window OLS regression. Point estimate plotted in blue, 90 percent confidence
band plotted in red.
we find a strong positive relation, increasing labor market efficiency, which helped to drive down
the unemployment rate.
Overall we find a negative relation between search and financial frictions in the early 2000’
recession and during parts of the Great Recession. Both of those two recessions were characterized
by jobless recoveries. The time-instability adds another dimension to the problem and offers an
alternative explanation for the emergence of jobless recoveries.
3.3 A Vector Error Correction Model
The model we consider is a five-dimensional system
yt = (mt, FFt, Yt, Ut, Vt)
′ , (7)
with cointegrating rank 2.9 Then, the VECM(p) model is given by
∆yt = µ+Πyt−1 +
p−1
i=1
Γi∆yt−i + ut, (8)
where Π = αβ′ with α and β being (K × r) matrices, where K is the dimension of the system and
r is the rank of Π. Further, Γi are parameter matrices of size (K ×K) and µ is an unrestricted
constant. Finally, ut ∼ (0,Σu) is white noise. A lag length test indicates that a lag of 12 months is
optimal. Estimating this model with an unrestricted trend and constant using the five time series
discussed earlier generates our main results discussed in the next sections.10
9As shown by a Johansen cointegration test with unrestricted trend and constant.
10We have performed several robustness checks including a restricted trend, no trend, the ordering in the VECM,
and including other variables.
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Figure 5: Response of match efficiency to a shock in financial frictions. Grey area is the 90 %
bootstrapped confidence band.
3.3.1 Impulse Responses
In this section we discuss the impulse responses of a shock in match efficiency and financial frictions.
Figure 5 presents the response of the match efficiency to an one-standard error shock in financial
frictions. We observe that the shock to financial frictions has no on-impact or short-run effects on
the match efficiency. However, after roughly 15 months we find a significant positive effect. This
effect varies between 0.005 and 0.02, which is, given a mean of 1.15 with a standard deviation
of 0.12 of the match efficiency time series, a fairly strong effect. This supports our conclusion
that an increase in financial frictions will lead to a more efficient labor market. Further, the
positive upshift holds for at least 15 months. We can conclude that the financial friction shock
has significant, positive effects over the medium-run on the labor market. Figure 6 presents the
response of the financial frictions to an one-standard error shock in match efficiency. We observe
no significant effect of the change in the efficiency of the labor market towards the frictions in the
financial market.
3.3.2 Variance Decomposition
Given that there is no significant effect of labor market frictions towards the financial market, we
will continue and try to understand the driving forces of fluctuations in match efficiency. Figure
7 plots the contribution of each shock to the total variance in match efficiency over 48 months.
On-impact, only the match efficiency shock drives the response in match efficiency. Then, over the
short-run (less than a year) the shock to unemployment and vacancies are the main driving forces
(both about 25 percent) of the fluctuations in match efficiency. After a year, the financial friction
10









Figure 6: Response of financial frictions to a shock in match efficiency. Grey area is the 90 %
bootstrapped confidence band.
shock becomes more and more important and its importance increases from about five percent
to more than 50 percent after 30 months. Over this medium-run the vacancies, unemployment,
match efficiency, and GDP shocks contribute in descending order to the total fluctuation in match
efficiency. Finally, over the long-run the financial friction shock explains about 60 percent of the
total variance in match efficiency. The second main driver are innovations to vacancies, followed
by unemployment shocks. Match efficiency and GDP shocks jointly explain about 10 percent of
the variation in match efficiency over the long-run.
4 A Dynamic Macro Model
This section develops a dynamic, micro-founded macro model of the U. S. economy in discrete time
with a link between labor market and financial frictions. We build a medium-scale DSGE model
with search and matching frictions and the financial accelerator of Bernanke et al. (1999). A period
is assumed to be a quarter. The model is close to the one used by Christiano et al. (2011), Mumtaz
and Zanetti (2013), or Zanetti (2015).
4.1 Household
Our economy is populated by a continuum of infinitively-lived identical households, consisting of
family members of measure one. Households equally share income and risk. Preferences are given
11



















Figure 7: Variance decomposition for match efficiency over 48 months.











where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and E is the mathematical expectation operator. Consump-
tion is denoted by Ct and labor units provided by the household is denoted by Nt.
Our economy begins with all households having identical financial wealth and consumption
histories. Hence, this homogeneity continues and we are able to consider the optimal decisions
of a representative household. The representative household maximizes utility subject to budget
constraint
Rt−1Bt−1 +WtNt +Πt + Tt + bUt = PtCt +Bt, (10)
where the household owns bonds, Bt, paying a gross nominal interest rate Rt. The household gen-
erates income from working, WtNt, from receiving transfers, Tt, and from profits, Πt. Unemployed
family members, Ut = 1 − Nt, receive unemployment benefits, b. The household than chooses












where λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint and πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the inflation rate.
4.2 Labor Market
In contrast to the good market, the labor market is imperfect. We assume search and matching
frictions on the labor market such that trade is uncoordinated, costly, and time-consuming.
12
Each firm has one job that is either filled or vacant. They create jobs at the rate M (Ut, Vt) at
vacancy posting costs c > 0. Here, M is the matching function





where ϕ > 0 is the elasticity of the matching function w.r.t. unemployment, Vt is the vacancy rate.
Further, mt > 0 is the match efficiency. We assume the following specification
mt = ξt − τFFt−1. (14)
Financial frictions are defined as in eq. (5) and τ ≥ 0 governs the strength of the link between the
two frictions. Further, there exists a match efficiency shock
ln ξt = ρξ ln ξt−1 + eξ,t, (15)
eξ,t ∼ N (0, σξ) . (16)
If the job is filled, it is subject to the probability of being exogenously destructed ρ > 0. Then, labor
market tightness is given by θt = Vt/Ut and the vacancy filling probability is q (θt) =M (Ut, Vt) /Vt.
Combining entry and exit gives the law of employment
Nt = (1− ρ) (Nt−1 +Mt−1) . (17)
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Workers earn a wage while suffering the disutility from working. Further, if the job is not destroyed
they receive the value of being employed in the next period. If the job is destroyed, they receive
the value of being unemployed. The value of being unemployed is












Unemployed workers receive the value of being unemployed and the discounted, expected value of
being employed with probability q (θt+1) or the value of staying unemployed.























The wage depends on three factors. The disutility from working, the unemployment benefits, and
the discounted, expected value of future hiring costs saved if the match continues.
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4.3 Entrepreneurs







where α ∈ (0, 1) and Zt is a Hicks-neutral technology shock. It follows an autoregressive process
lnZt = ρZ lnZt−1 + eZ,t, (23)
eZ,t ∼ N (0, σZ) , (24)
where ρZ ∈ (0, 1) is the autocorrelation parameter and its innovations are i.i.d. over time and
normally distributed.
The capital accumulation technology is given by
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It, (25)
where It is investment.




βtλt [Yt −NtWt − cVt −QtIt] . (26)
subject to the production technology, the capital accumulation technology, and the law of employ-
ment. The first-order conditions are given by



















+ λt+1Qt+1 (1− δ)

, (28)
where ̺t are real marginal costs (the Lagrange multiplier on the production technology). The first
equation pins down labor demand, while the second equation is an Euler equation for capital.
Entrepreneurs acquire physical capital being used to produce output. Acquisitions are financed
by entrepreneurs net worth, νt, and borrowing, QtKt+1 − νt, from a financial intermediary. The
financial intermediary obtains its funds from households savings at the riskless gross rate of return,
Rt. The financial structure features an agency problem, namely the costly state verification ap-
proach.11 Due to the implied imperfectness of information, the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not
longer hold and external financing becomes more expensive than internal financing.













11This agency problem makes external finance more expensive than internal funds due to auditing costs.
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which is the entrepreneur’s demand for capital.
















The concave function s (·) is the gross external finance premium, i.e. the ratio of external and
internal finance, and depends on the borrower’s leverage ratio.12
Further, aggregate entrepreneurial net worth is given by
νt+1 = γ∆t + (1− γ) gt. (31)
The probability that an entrepreneur survives until the next period is denoted by γ > 0. This
assumption results implies that entrepreneurs will never acquire enough net worth to fully finance
the new capital acquisitions. Further, ∆t is period’s t− 1 net worth
∆t = R
K
t KtQt−1 − Et−1





Capital producers in our economy produce capital goods for the entrepreneurs buying final goods















where ω > 0 and the latter term represents quadratic adjustment costs. The solution is given by







This is the well-known equation for Tobin’s Q. Movements in asset prices affect Tobin’s Q and then
affect entrepreneurial net worth and therefore firm’s optimal decisions.
4.5 Retailers
Our model features a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers named i ∈ [0, 1]. They










where φ > 1 is the demand elasticity and Yt (i) is the output sold by firm i. Then, the demand




















is the price index.
Retailers set prices according to the Calvo (1983) pricing mechanism. Only a fraction (1− ζ)
of firms is able to reset prices in a given period while the other firms are only able to update their



















again, ̺t are real marginal costs. The optimality condition is given by





















The aggregate price follows
Pt =








Finally, the New Keynesian Phillips curve is given by
π̂t = βEt [π̂t+1] + κˆ̺t (41)
where κ = (1− βζ) (1− ζ) /ζ.
4.6 Closing the Model and Calibration
The monetary policy rule follows a standard Taylor-rule. This rule is given by
Rt = κY Yt + κππt, (42)
with the weights κY > 0 on output and κπ > 0 on inflation.
The market clearing condition is









The model is then log-linearized around the non-stochastic steady state and calibrated on a quar-
terly basis for the United States according to empirical evidence and stylized facts.
The discount factor β is 0.99, which corresponds to an annual rate of 4 %. The labor share in the
production function is set to a standard value of 2/3. The quarterly exogenous capital depreciation
rate is set to 0.025. Tobin’s Q in steady state is set to 1. In line with Bernanke et al. (1999), the
investment adjustment costs are set to 0.25, which is equal to the elasticity of the price of capital
with regard to the investment capital ratio. The annualized business failure rate is set to 4%.
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Steady state inflation is set to one percent. The elasticity of substitution is set to 11, such that
steady state marginal costs are 10/11. The Calvo probability is set to 0.60. Monetary policy sets
a weight of 1.5 on the inflation rate, satisfying the Taylor-principle and sets a weight of 0.125 on
output.
Along the labor market dynamics of the model, we assume an unemployment rate of 12 percent.
This rate accounts for the nonconformity of effective searchers and unemployed workers. The
steady-state matching rate q is calibrated to be 0.7 as in den Haan et al. (2000). Further, we
assume symmetric bargaining between firm and worker and set η = 0.5. Vacancy posting costs are
calibrated to 0.05, which is close to the value used in Krause and Lubik (2007). Then, vacancies
in steady state are V = M/q and labor market tightness is θ = V/U . The job separation rate is
set to 0.06, close to the value used in Merz (1995) with 0.07. This implies a steady state match
efficiency of m = ρN .
Finally, the autocorrelation of both shocks is set to 0.9.
5 Discussion
We begin with a discussion of the model dynamics generated by a positive match efficiency shock.
Figure 8 presents the impulse responses for the standard model - without a link between the two
frictions, i.e. τ = 0, - a weak, negative link (τ = 10) and a strong, negative link (τ = 50). The
value of 50 for the strong link is taken from the rolling-window regression studied in section 3.2,
while the value of 10 is used for expository purposes.
As in Furlanetto and Groshenny (2012), the increase in match efficiency makes it easier for
firms to fill vacancies because the job filling rate, qt, increases. Unemployment decreases, as more
unemployed workers find a job. Higher employment then increases output, consumption, and
investment. At the same time, firms react to the increase in match efficiency with posting fewer
vacancies, as they are - ceteris paribus - able to keep the same number of matches with lower
vacancy postings. Financial frictions decrease because the difference between the return earned in
business from operating physical capital and the safe rate decreases. Firm’s net worth decreases
initially but then overshoots and decreases towards the old steady state according to its process
defined by eq. (31) and (32). Due to lower inflation and higher output the central bank lowers
the interest rate in order to drive inflation back to the steady state. The effect of the link between
search and financial frictions is very limited for the match efficiency shock. This is due to the fact
that the shock itself has only a very limited effect on real factors and, most importantly, financial
factors. Therefore dynamics in match efficiency are mainly governed by the shock process.
After discussing the match efficiency shock we turn to the dynamics generated by a positive,
stationary technology shock and focus on how the link between search and financial frictions helps
understanding jobless recoveries. Figure 9 presents the impulse responses for the standard model -
without a link between the two frictions, i.e. τ = 0, - a weak, negative link (τ = 10) and a strong,
negative link (τ = 50).
17
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Figure 8: Impulse response functions for a match efficiency shock for the standard model (without)
and a strong link (τ = 5) between labor market and financial frictions.
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An increase in productivity shifts the production frontier outside allowing firms to produce more
output. Incentives for the firms to raise the employment level are created by higher output and
consumption. Firms increase vacancy posting and matches increase. The job-filling rate, qt, drops
due to the stronger increase in vacancies than in matches and labor market tightness increases.13
As a consequence, employment increases, unemployment decreases and we find a strong negative
correlation between unemployment and vacancies, i.e. a Beveridge curve. According to the Nash
bargaining solution, firm and worker share the increased surpluses and wages increase in response
to the shock.
At the same time, higher productivity lowers marginal costs and, therefore, the inflation rate
decreases. However, refinancing costs (asset prices) for firms increase and, jointly with the rise in
wages, this increases marginal costs on impact. Higher output and lower inflation imply that, via
the Taylor-rule, the central bank lowers the interest rate. Lower gross returns and the lower nominal
interest rate reduce the risk premium. Financial frictions in our economy are reduced because of
the lower safe rate and because the increase in Tobin’s Q reduces the value of the extra units of
output produced (cf. eq. (5)). Firm’s net worth decreases on impact but quickly overshoots due
to the additional capital holdings and higher capital prices (who caused the initial drop). The less
frictional financial markets with higher net worth makes it easier for firms to borrow and investment
increases.
What happens if we consider the model specification with the link between search and financial
frictions? We have already discussed that financial frictions decrease and, with the negative link in
place, now there is a channel from financial to labor market frictions that is absent in the standard
model without the link. The drop in financial frictions now generates an increase in match efficiency.
From figure 9 we can infer that the increase in match efficiency increases in the strength of the link
between the two frictions. We have already learned about the dynamics triggered by an increase
in match efficiency: vacancies decrease because the more efficient labor market allows the firms
to increase matches even with less vacancies posted. In sum, there is lower unemployment while
output, consumption, and investment increase. Given the positive effects from the technology
shock, the additional increase of match efficiency leads to a much stronger response along the labor
market. We observe hump-shaped adjustment paths for almost all variables (except matches and
Tobin’s Q) implying that the channel creates much more internal propagation of the technology
shock. With higher output for a longer period of time, firms adjust differently along the capital
side. Over time, they invest more and the increase in the capital stock is larger and, again, more
persistent. This also implies that firm’s net worth is larger compared to the model without the link.
Moreover, marginal costs, due to the stronger response of wages and asset prices, stay above its
steady state value for a longer period of time. Therefore, prices do not decrease as in the standard
model and we observe upward pressure on the inflation rate. Hence, the central bank in our model,
operating a Taylor-rule, increase the interest rate for several quarters until the inflation rate falls
13 Intuitively, if a firm posts a vacancy, it decreases the probability of other firms filling a vacancy (congestion
externality).
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below its steady state value. The link between search and financial frictions therefore changes the
path of monetary policy in response to the technology shock.
Finally, we want to discuss the implications of this channel for the jobless recovery. If we
compare the dynamics of the model with and without the link, we find that (i) output is slightly
more sluggish and (ii) unemployment is strongly affected, featuring a large hump-shaped adjustment
process. The link between the two frictions generates a strong internal propagation mechanism.
Simulations of a one-off shock shows that the autocorrelation of output is hardly affected (0.14 vs.
0.16) but the one of unemployment is increased significantly: from 0.24 in the model without a link
to 0.96 in the model with the link.
As a consequence, in the model with a link, output returns to its steady state long before unem-
ployment does. This is not the case in the standard model without the link. If we would simulate
a negative shock, the model would generate a jobless recovery. Further, the model dynamics are in
line with the stylized empirical facts of the Great Recession: a simultaneous increase in financial
frictions and a decrease in match efficiency as well as the jobless recovery. Further, vacancies in the
model drop (increase in case of a negative shock) by about 20 percent once we consider the strong
link. This is in line with the data from the JOLTS database reporting an increase of job postings
of 32 percent from 2011 to 2013; the time the negative link is in place.
6 Conclusion
The Great Recession, like other recent recession in Europe and the United States, is characterized
by a jobless recovery. While output returned to pre-crisis levels unemployment is still above its
pre-crisis level. In this paper, we develop a link between labor market and financial frictions that
offer an explanation for this observation. This direct link between the two frictions is a novelty in
the literature.
The paper has an empirical and a theoretical contribution. Empirically, we find that financial
frictions are a significant factor for the dynamics of match efficiency. Then, we document time
variability in this relation and show that there was a negative link between the two time series
during large parts of the Great Recession. Lastly, we estimate a VECM model and show that a
shock to financial frictions increases match efficiency.
The theoretical contribution is to build a DSGE model with search and matching frictions and
financial frictions including our new channel. We simulate the model and show that the model
with a strong, negative relation between the two frictions generates a jobless recovery. The new
channel creates a strong internal propagation mechanism and the simulated model dynamics are in
line with the stylized empirical facts of the Great Recession. The model generates a simultaneous
increase in financial frictions and a decrease in match efficiency observed in the empirical part.
One limiting factor of our study is the absence of a theory why the two frictions are related.
We leave this to future research and focus on establishing the link in the data and present a model





































































Figure 9: Impulse response functions for a technology shock for the standard model (without) and
a strong link (τ = 5) between labor market and financial frictions.
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